

## REMARKS

### I. STATUS OF CLAIMS

In accordance with the foregoing, claims 1-3, 5-9 and 11-14 have been amended and new claims 15-16 are added by the present amendment. Claims 1-16 are pending and under consideration. Applicants assert that no new matter has been added.

### II. REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1-14 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) AS BEING UNPATENTABLE OVER KLUG (US 5,790,785) IN VIEW OF HUNT (US 6,496,855)

Claims 1-14 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Klug (US 5,790,785) in view of Hunt (US 6,496,855). This rejection is respectfully traversed because neither Klug nor Hunt, individually or combined, describe the *automatic* transfer of membership registration information from a service provision site to a central management system.

The embodiment of claim 1, for example (as amended herein), relates to a membership management system wherein "the one of the service provision sites receiving the application first registers the membership information into the database held by the one of the service provision sites, and then subsequently when the user is not registered in the database held by the integrated membership management center, the membership information of the user is automatically transferred from the one of the service provision sites to the integrated membership management center and registered into the database held by the integrated membership management center. . ."

Klug, on the other hand, essentially describes a registration process that works in reverse. More specifically, in Klug, when a user visits a third party site and desires to register to the registrar, the user is *redirected* to the registrar website. (See Fig. 4A Step 424). The user then registers *at* the registrar (Step 428). The registration information is then obtained *from* the registrar. (Step 432). Furthermore, if the user supplies registration information directly to the third party site, the user is not registered with the registrar. (Step 420).

The Applicant respectfully submits that Hunt fails to make up for the deficiencies of Klug as mentioned above.

The Office Action asserts that Hunt describes a web registration system and method wherein when a user is already registered at a third party site, the user's registration information is automatically transferred (Citing Step 302) to the central registration database (RAS) as claimed. (See Office Action pg. 4 par. 2). Applicant respectfully disagrees with this interpretation of the Hunt citation.

Applicant asserts that the user's registration information is not *automatically* transferred to the central registration database (RAS). Instead, when a user is already registered at a referring site and desires to have their registration information entered into the RAS, the user must *re-enter* their referring site registration information via the RAS. In Hunt, the user must first click on the RAS button and a RAS pop-up window appears. (See column 8, lines 61-63, See also Fig. 5 Step 300). The user must then log-in to RAS. (See column 8, lines 63-64, Step 301). The user indicates they are a user of the referring site. The user then enters their current registration or log-in information for the referring site and then clicks the enter button. (See Step 302, See also column 9, line 1-2). Only after the user *re-enters* their registration information for the referring site at the RAS does the registration information of the referring site get added to the RAS.

In the event that the user is not already registered with the referring site, the user must still first log-in to the RAS and then enter the user enters registration information for the referring site directly to the RAS. (See column 7, lines 45-46, See also Fig 4. Step 202).

Moreover, the referring site does not directly send registration information to the RAS. In Hunt, when the term "Transfer log-in details to RAS" is used, (See Step 302, 402, and 406 for example) applicant asserts that the RAS obtains the necessary data fields for registration, not the registration information itself. In fact, "it is preferred that the process is entirely transparent to the website of interest [referring site] in the sense that it is wholly unaware of the involvement of an intermediary [RAS]." (Column 8, lines 52-55).

Therefore, Applicant asserts that neither Klug nor Hunt, individually or combined, describe the distinguishing feature of the *automatic* transfer of membership registration information from a service provision site to a central management system as in claim 1.

Claims 2, 3, 5-9 and 11-14 also emphasize the automatic transfer of registration information from the service provision site to the central management system.

The dependent claims depend from the above-discussed independent claims and are patentable over the prior art for the reasons discussed above. The dependent claims also recite additional features not taught or suggested by the prior art. For example, claim 4 calls for the entry of information not needed at the site at which registration is being performed. The prior art does not teach or suggest such. It is submitted that the dependent claims are independently patentable over the prior art.

### III. CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, it is respectfully submitted that each of the claims patently distinguishes over the prior art, and therefore, defines allowable subject matter. There being no further outstanding objections or rejections, it is submitted that the application is in condition for allowance. An early action to that effect is courteously solicited.

Finally, if there are any formal matters remaining after this response, the Examiner is requested to telephone the undersigned to attend to these matters.

If there are any additional fees associated with filing of this Amendment, please charge the same to our Deposit Account No. 19-3935.

Respectfully submitted,

STAAS & HALSEY LLP

Date: 8/7/07

By: Richard A. Gollhofer  
Richard A. Gollhofer  
Registration No. 31,106

1201 New York Avenue, NW, 7th Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Telephone: (202) 434-1500  
Facsimile: (202) 434-1501